diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index 0ed9cce..9ba8051 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Single-process Express app bound to `127.0.0.1:3000`. Nginx is the only public i
 
 `bifrost_joins` logs every click of the final "Join Project Bifrost" CTA — one row per click (auto-increment `id`, `email`, `clicked_at`, `session_id`). Writes come from `POST /api/bifrost-join` (behind `requireAuth`); reads come from `bin/joins.js`. See OPERATIONS.md for admin usage.
 
-**Hidden admin page** at `/fenjaops` (deliberately obscure URL, not `/admin`) — gated by `requireAuth` + `requireAdmin` (`is_admin` column on `invites`). Non-admins get a plain 404 so the URL's existence isn't leaked. Files live in `admin/` at the repo root (outside `public/` and `protected/` so only the explicit route reaches them). Admins can create **non-admin** invites from the page (`POST /api/fenjaops/invites` → stores `is_admin=0`, audit trail records the acting admin's email in `invited_by`). Promotion to admin and removal of invites stay **CLI-only** via `bin/invite.js admin add|remove|list` — a web session compromise cannot escalate the invite list. Internal code keeps the word "admin" (middleware, files, CLI); only the public URL is obscured.
+**Hidden admin page** at `/fenjaops` (deliberately obscure URL, not `/admin`) — gated by `requireAuth` + `requireAdmin` (`is_admin` column on `invites`). Non-admins get a plain 404 so the URL's existence isn't leaked. Files live in `admin/` at the repo root (outside `public/` and `protected/` so only the explicit route reaches them). Admins can **create** non-admin invites (`POST /api/fenjaops/invites`, stores `is_admin=0`, audit trail records the acting admin in `invited_by`) and **remove** non-admin invites from the page (`DELETE /api/fenjaops/invites/:email`; rejects removing admins or oneself, also kills any active sessions for the deleted email). Admin promotion / demotion stays CLI-only (`bin/invite.js admin add|remove|list`) so a web session compromise cannot escalate or lock everyone out. Internal code keeps the word "admin" (middleware, files, CLI); only the public URL is obscured.
 
 **Rate limiting** (`src/middleware.js`) is a SQLite-backed sliding window keyed per-IP — 5 code requests/hour, 20 verify attempts/hour. Nginx adds another layer via a `limit_req_zone` declared in `/etc/nginx/nginx.conf`.
 
diff --git a/PROJECT.md b/PROJECT.md
index 7a9481d..bba7038 100644
--- a/PROJECT.md
+++ b/PROJECT.md
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ These things define the security model. Breaking any of them is a regression eve
 - **No inline `<script>` in any HTML** — CSP is strict (`script-src 'self'`). All JS is in separate files.
 - **Node binds to `127.0.0.1` only.** Nginx is the single ingress.
 - **`/etc/fenja/env` is minimal** (`PORT`, `PUBLIC_ORIGIN`, `NODE_ENV`), owned `root:fenja` mode 640, never in `/opt/fenja/`. Adding secrets back is a security review.
-- **No web endpoint can set `is_admin=1` or delete an invite.** The admin page exposes `POST /api/fenjaops/invites` for creating *non-admin* invites only — the handler ignores any `is_admin` field in the body and always stores `0`. Admin promotion (`setInviteAdmin`) and invite deletion (`deleteInvite`) are reachable only via `bin/invite.js` on the VPS. This means a compromised admin session can grow the invite list but cannot escalate anyone (including themselves) or evict existing users.
+- **No web endpoint can set `is_admin=1`, and no web endpoint can delete or demote an admin.** The admin page exposes `POST /api/fenjaops/invites` for creating *non-admin* invites (the handler ignores any `is_admin` field in the body and always stores `0`), and `DELETE /api/fenjaops/invites/:email` for removing *non-admin* invites (the handler refuses if `is_admin=1` or if the target email equals the caller's own email). Admin promotion (`setInviteAdmin`) and admin demotion / self-deletion are reachable only via `bin/invite.js` on the VPS. This means a compromised admin session can grow or prune the non-admin invite list, but it cannot escalate anyone to admin, demote an existing admin, or lock all other admins out.
 
 If a change forces one of these to move, it's not a local change — it's a security review.
 
diff --git a/admin/admin.css b/admin/admin.css
index 566293e..5484bb5 100644
--- a/admin/admin.css
+++ b/admin/admin.css
@@ -129,6 +129,36 @@ html, body {
   color: var(--admin);
   font-weight: 700;
 }
+.t .dim { color: var(--ink-dim); }
+
+/* Row action buttons (Remove, …). Quiet by default, crimson on hover
+   so the destructive intent reads clearly before the click. */
+.row-action {
+  all: unset;
+  cursor: pointer;
+  font-size: 11.5px;
+  font-weight: 600;
+  letter-spacing: 0.06em;
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+  padding: 5px 10px;
+  border-radius: 3px;
+  background: transparent;
+  color: var(--ink-soft);
+  box-shadow: inset 0 0 0 1px var(--line);
+  transition:
+    background 140ms ease,
+    color 140ms ease,
+    box-shadow 140ms ease;
+}
+.row-action:hover {
+  color: #fff;
+  background: var(--admin);
+  box-shadow: inset 0 0 0 1px var(--admin);
+}
+.row-action:disabled {
+  opacity: 0.55;
+  cursor: progress;
+}
 
 .empty {
   margin: 12px 2px 0;
diff --git a/admin/admin.js b/admin/admin.js
index b6e1f11..dd78e3e 100644
--- a/admin/admin.js
+++ b/admin/admin.js
@@ -28,6 +28,12 @@ function escapeHtml(s) {
   }[c]));
 }
 
+// Email of the currently-authenticated admin, set by load() from
+// /auth/me. Used to suppress the "Remove" button on the viewer's
+// own row so they can't accidentally delete themselves from the UI
+// (the server also rejects this, but hiding the control is clearer).
+let currentAdminEmail = null;
+
 function renderInvites(rows) {
   const tbody = document.querySelector('#t-invites tbody');
   const empty = document.getElementById('empty-invites');
@@ -40,16 +46,69 @@ function renderInvites(rows) {
   tbody.innerHTML = rows.map((r) => {
     const when = new Date(r.invited_at).toISOString().slice(0, 10);
     const admin = r.is_admin ? '<span class="badge">Admin</span>' : '';
+    // Action cell: "Remove" button for non-admin rows that aren't
+    // the viewer's own. Admin rows require a CLI demote first (see
+    // the server's cannot_remove_admin guard) — the column shows
+    // a dash instead. Self row: also a dash.
+    let action = '<span class="dim">—</span>';
+    if (!r.is_admin && r.email !== currentAdminEmail) {
+      action = `<button type="button" class="row-action row-action--delete"
+                  data-email="${escapeHtml(r.email)}">Remove</button>`;
+    }
     return `<tr>
       <td>${escapeHtml(r.email)}</td>
       <td>${escapeHtml(r.first_name || '')}</td>
       <td class="when">${when}</td>
       <td>${escapeHtml(r.invited_by || '')}</td>
       <td class="num">${admin}</td>
+      <td class="num">${action}</td>
     </tr>`;
   }).join('');
 }
 
+// Event delegation — one listener on the table, dispatched to the
+// clicked row-action button. Avoids re-binding every re-render.
+(function wireInviteActions() {
+  const table = document.getElementById('t-invites');
+  if (!table) return;
+  table.addEventListener('click', async (ev) => {
+    const btn = ev.target.closest('.row-action--delete');
+    if (!btn) return;
+    const email = btn.dataset.email;
+    if (!email) return;
+    if (!window.confirm(`Remove invite for ${email}?\n\nThis also kicks them out of any active session.`)) return;
+
+    btn.disabled = true;
+    const original = btn.textContent;
+    btn.textContent = 'Removing…';
+    try {
+      const res = await fetch('/api/fenjaops/invites/' + encodeURIComponent(email), {
+        method: 'DELETE',
+        credentials: 'same-origin',
+      });
+      if (res.status === 200) {
+        load(); // refresh the whole board — simplest + shows new counts
+        return;
+      }
+      const payload = await res.json().catch(() => ({}));
+      const msg = {
+        invalid_email:      'That email is invalid.',
+        cannot_remove_self: 'You cannot remove your own admin account.',
+        cannot_remove_admin:'Demote this admin via the CLI first (bin/invite.js admin remove).',
+        not_found:          'That invite is already gone.',
+      }[payload.error] || `Remove failed (HTTP ${res.status}).`;
+      alert(msg);
+      btn.disabled = false;
+      btn.textContent = original;
+    } catch (err) {
+      console.error('[admin] remove invite', err);
+      alert('Network error — see server logs.');
+      btn.disabled = false;
+      btn.textContent = original;
+    }
+  });
+})();
+
 function renderSummary(rows) {
   const tbody = document.querySelector('#t-summary tbody');
   const empty = document.getElementById('empty-summary');
@@ -89,9 +148,10 @@ function renderClicks(rows) {
 
 async function load() {
   try {
-    const [invitesRes, joinsRes] = await Promise.all([
+    const [invitesRes, joinsRes, meRes] = await Promise.all([
       fetch('/api/fenjaops/invites', { credentials: 'same-origin' }),
       fetch('/api/fenjaops/joins',   { credentials: 'same-origin' }),
+      fetch('/auth/me',              { credentials: 'same-origin' }),
     ]);
 
     if (!invitesRes.ok || !joinsRes.ok) {
@@ -101,6 +161,15 @@ async function load() {
       return;
     }
 
+    // Capture the viewer's own email so renderInvites() can suppress
+    // the delete button on their own row. Non-fatal if this fetch
+    // fails — worst case the user sees a Remove button on their own
+    // row and the server's cannot_remove_self guard catches the click.
+    if (meRes.ok) {
+      const me = await meRes.json().catch(() => ({}));
+      currentAdminEmail = (me.email || '').toLowerCase() || null;
+    }
+
     const invites = await invitesRes.json();
     const joins   = await joinsRes.json();
 
diff --git a/admin/index.html b/admin/index.html
index 66f95dc..4a6a277 100644
--- a/admin/index.html
+++ b/admin/index.html
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
     <h2>Invites</h2>
     <table class="t" id="t-invites">
       <thead><tr>
-        <th>Email</th><th>Name</th><th>Invited</th><th>By</th><th class="num">Admin</th>
+        <th>Email</th><th>Name</th><th>Invited</th><th>By</th><th class="num">Admin</th><th class="num">Action</th>
       </tr></thead>
       <tbody></tbody>
     </table>
diff --git a/server.js b/server.js
index 08d5b63..fe9c78d 100644
--- a/server.js
+++ b/server.js
@@ -132,6 +132,33 @@ app.post('/api/fenjaops/invites', requireAuth, requireAdmin, (req, res) => {
   return res.status(201).json({ email: normalized, first_name: firstName });
 });
 
+// Remove a non-admin invite from the admin UI. Guardrails:
+//   (1) cannot remove an admin row — demote via the CLI first,
+//       so a compromised admin session can't lock everyone out;
+//   (2) cannot remove yourself — prevents self-inflicted lockouts.
+// Deleting the invite also deletes any active sessions for that
+// email so the user is kicked out immediately instead of holding
+// their 30-day cookie.
+app.delete('/api/fenjaops/invites/:email', requireAuth, requireAdmin, (req, res) => {
+  const raw = decodeURIComponent(req.params.email || '').trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (!raw || !EMAIL_RE.test(raw)) {
+    return res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_email' });
+  }
+  if (raw === req.session.email) {
+    return res.status(400).json({ error: 'cannot_remove_self' });
+  }
+  const invite = q.getInvite.get(raw);
+  if (!invite) {
+    return res.status(404).json({ error: 'not_found' });
+  }
+  if (invite.is_admin) {
+    return res.status(403).json({ error: 'cannot_remove_admin' });
+  }
+  q.deleteInvite.run(raw);
+  q.deleteSessionsForEmail.run(raw);
+  return res.status(200).json({ email: raw, deleted: true });
+});
+
 app.get('/api/fenjaops/joins', requireAuth, requireAdmin, (req, res) => {
   res.json({
     clicks:       q.listJoins.all(),