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Six scroll-bound scenes (hero, architecture stack, words fly-in,
aurora arc, treasure-map, join CTA) now live inside page-overview,
above the existing 23-headline timeline. The Europe map stays as a
static background that fades with scroll.
- protected/index.html: rewrote #page-overview only; timeline and
archive sections unchanged. Site-2 palette re-mapped to site-1
Nordic Editorial tokens, Fraunces to Newsreader, tokens scoped
to #page-overview.
- protected/timeline.js: dot-nav boots window.__bifrost.init()
on first Overview activation. Added .js class on documentElement.
- protected/bifrost.js (new): Lenis + ScrollTrigger wired to the
overview's internal scroller via scrollerProxy; drives Europe
map opacity on scroll.
- protected/vendor/{lenis,gsap,scrolltrigger}.min.js (new):
extracted from site-2's inlined vendor blobs; CSP-compliant.
- protected/fenja/illustrations/{community,council,pilot}.svg
(new): treasure-map stop images.
No changes to src/, server.js, deploy/, or public/. CSP stays
strict (script-src 'self'); zero inline scripts added. Auth gate
and session model untouched.
|
||
|---|---|---|
| bin | ||
| data | ||
| deploy | ||
| protected | ||
| public | ||
| src | ||
| .env.example | ||
| .gitignore | ||
| CHECKLIST.md | ||
| CLAUDE.md | ||
| INSTALL.md | ||
| MERGE_NOTES.md | ||
| OPERATIONS.md | ||
| package-lock.json | ||
| package.json | ||
| PROJECT.md | ||
| README.md | ||
| server.js | ||
project-bifrost
Invite-only Fenja AI entrance and archive. Node/Express + SQLite + SMTP, behind Nginx on a VPS.
Local development (Windows / VS Code)
# 1. Install deps
npm install
# 2. Configure
copy .env.example .env
# Edit .env:
# CODE_PEPPER — generate with: openssl rand -hex 32
# (or any 64-char hex string; use the same one in prod)
# SMTP_* — your relay credentials
# MAIL_FROM — e.g. "Fenja AI <noreply@project-bifrost.fenja.ai>"
# 3. Invite yourself
node bin/invite.js add your@email.com
# 4. Run
npm run dev
# → http://127.0.0.1:3000
# 5. Walk the flow:
# a) Open http://127.0.0.1:3000
# b) Enter your invited email → receive code by mail
# c) Type code → lands on /archive
# d) Hit http://127.0.0.1:3000/archive directly in a private window:
# should redirect to / (proves gating works)
Deploying to the VPS
This assumes:
- VPS with Nginx already running and TLS for
project-bifrost.fenja.ai - Node 20+ installed
- A
fenjasystem user owns/opt/fenja
First-time setup
# On the VPS
sudo useradd -r -s /usr/sbin/nologin fenja
sudo mkdir -p /opt/fenja
sudo chown -R fenja:fenja /opt/fenja
Pushing code from Windows
From the project root, sync with rsync (via WSL) or scp/WinSCP:
# Example rsync (requires WSL or rsync on Windows)
rsync -avz --delete `
--exclude node_modules --exclude data --exclude .env --exclude .git `
./ user@vps:/opt/fenja/
Then on the VPS:
cd /opt/fenja
sudo -u fenja npm ci --omit=dev
sudo chmod 750 /opt/fenja/protected
sudo chmod 750 /opt/fenja/data
Create /opt/fenja/.env in place (do NOT rsync it — keep secrets off your laptop):
sudo -u fenja nano /opt/fenja/.env
sudo chmod 600 /opt/fenja/.env
Install the systemd unit and Nginx config:
sudo cp deploy/fenja.service /etc/systemd/system/fenja.service
sudo systemctl daemon-reload
sudo systemctl enable --now fenja
sudo systemctl status fenja # should be "active (running)"
sudo cp deploy/nginx.conf /etc/nginx/sites-available/project-bifrost
sudo ln -sf /etc/nginx/sites-available/project-bifrost \
/etc/nginx/sites-enabled/project-bifrost
# Also ensure the rate-limit zone is declared — see deploy/nginx.conf for the one-liner
sudo nginx -t
sudo systemctl reload nginx
Verifying from outside
curl -I https://project-bifrost.fenja.ai/
# 200 + HTML (the entrance)
curl -I https://project-bifrost.fenja.ai/archive
# 302 → /
curl -I https://project-bifrost.fenja.ai/protected/archive.html
# 404 (this URL literally does not exist)
curl -i -X POST https://project-bifrost.fenja.ai/auth/request-code \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"email":"nobody@example.com"}'
# 200 + {"ok":true} (no mail is actually sent; endpoint doesn't leak)
Managing invites on the server
sudo -u fenja node /opt/fenja/bin/invite.js add someone@example.com
sudo -u fenja node /opt/fenja/bin/invite.js list
sudo -u fenja node /opt/fenja/bin/invite.js remove someone@example.com
Backups
Add a cron job:
# /etc/cron.d/fenja-backup
0 3 * * * fenja sqlite3 /opt/fenja/data/fenja.sqlite ".backup /opt/fenja/data/backup-$(date +\%F).sqlite"
0 4 * * * fenja find /opt/fenja/data -name 'backup-*.sqlite' -mtime +14 -delete
.backup is safe on a live SQLite DB. cp is not.
Project layout
project-bifrost/
├── package.json
├── server.js # entry point — binds 127.0.0.1:3000
├── .env.example # copy to .env
├── .gitignore
├── bin/
│ └── invite.js # CLI: add / remove / list invites
├── src/
│ ├── db.js # SQLite schema + prepared statements
│ ├── sessions.js # codes, cookies, HMAC
│ ├── mail.js # Nodemailer SMTP transport
│ ├── middleware.js # rateLimit, requireAuth
│ └── auth.js # /auth/* router
├── public/ # served to anyone
│ └── index.html # the Entrance page
├── protected/ # served only with a valid session cookie
│ └── archive.html # placeholder for now; drop the real page here
├── data/ # created on first run — SQLite lives here
└── deploy/
├── nginx.conf
└── fenja.service
Security model at a glance
- Static HTML is never served from a public directory for
/archive. Node checks the session cookie before reading the file off disk. No cookie → 302 → / (the file bytes never leave the server). - The session cookie is
HttpOnly,Secure,SameSite=Lax. JavaScript on the page cannot read or steal it. - Sessions are opaque 256-bit random IDs stored in SQLite. Revoking is a DELETE.
- One-time codes are HMAC'd with a server-side pepper (
CODE_PEPPER) before storage. A DB leak alone cannot reveal codes. - Rate limits on everything. 5 code requests per IP per hour, 20 verify attempts per IP per hour, 5 wrong guesses per code before it's nuked.
/auth/request-codealways returns 200 — attackers cannot probe the invite list by email-enumeration.- Node binds to
127.0.0.1only. Nginx is the single ingress; there is no public Node port. - Strict CSP blocks inline scripts and foreign origins from the gated pages.